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The Political Economy of Italy in the EMU: What 
Went Wrong? 
 
By Leila Simona TALANI 
†1
 
  
Abstract. Although Italy was amongst the most enthusiastic founding members of the 
European Economic Community in 1957, the Italian capacity to respect the imperatives of 
European integration could not, and, still, cannot, be given for granted, as the recent 
sovereign debt crisis demonstrates. Apart from the many structural inconsistencies that 
persist not only in the economic, but also in the political and social organization of the 
country, also the public debate is sometimes characterised by a tendency to blame the 
process of Europeanisation for the less palatable decisions taken by the national 
institutions. This article addresses the sub-national, national and supranational dimensions 
of the process of Italian Europeanisation focusing in particular on the role of domestic 
socio-economic actors in influencing monetary policy decision making processes. The 
article is based on field research conducted by the author both in Italy and Brussels. The 
main object of this research effort was to analyse to what extent the outcomes of the 
process of European monetary integration have been influenced by domestic politics and by 
domestic economic interest groups in Italy with the final aim of assessing the impact of 
Italian entry into the EMU and especially its future within it. Thus, at the core of this 
research lies the following question: What is the role of domestic politics and domestic 
interest groups in monetary policy-making? The theoretical starting point of this 
interpretation of the process of European monetary integration is represented by an 
integrated domestic-foreign policy focusing on the role of economic interest groups in 
defining national exchange rate and monetary policy decisions. It is not here the place to 
discuss the different theories explaining the process of European integration and, more 
specifically, of the issue of European monetary integration. Here it will simply be 
underlined that, to explain foreign economic policy choices, policy outcomes need to be 
linked to domestic politics.  
Keywords. EMU, Eurozone crisis, Italy 
JEL. F45, F31, F51. 
 
1. Introduction: Italy and the crisis of the Euro-Zone 
rom the second half of 2011, Italy experienced an increased pressure on its 
sovereign debt from financial markets. From July to November 2011 the 
spread between the Italian BTPs (Italian 10 year treasury bills) and the 
German Bund, a common measure of such pressure, surpassed 400 basis points on 
many occasions. Although it was generally felt that the situation was extremely 
serious, this indicator tends to maximise the effects of the pressure on interest rates 
as it is strongly influenced by the reduction of the interest rates paid on the Bund, 
which, given the instability of the global economy, were selected by investors as a 
safe heaven. 
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In the same period, the interest rates of Italian long term debt emissions 
increased steadily to reach quota 6.99% in November 2011. However, the Bank of 
Italy noticed how the fiscal position had not yet become unsustainable. First of all, 
during the crisis Italian debt did not remain unsold
i
 and the allocation of Italian 
Treasury bills happened regularly. 
Moreover, in June 2011 Italian public debt was around 1900 billion Euros. Only 
39.2% was held by foreign investors, which is a relatively small percentage as 
compared to other European countries. Italian families held the biggest part of the 
debt, with residents holding around 14%, followed by banks, insurance companies 
and funds.
ii
The composition of debt ownership did not change substantially in the 
course of the crisis apart from an increase in the quota held by Italian banks.
iii
 
Finally, some the pressure on Italian debt needs to be inserted in the context of a 
liquidity shortage which brought many European investors to sell assets. 
 
 
GRAPH 1. Yields of Benchmark Government Securities-Italy 
Source: Bank of Italy 2011 
 
TABLE 1. Interest Rates-Italy Feb. 2011-Feb.2012 
 
Source: Bank of Italy 2011 
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Despite some evidence to the contrary, there was a widespread belief that Italy 
was on the verge of default. This was influenced by the extent that the political 
equilibrium of the country, resting on the centre-right government of Silvio 
Berlusconi, was shattered to the point of no-return. Amid fears of a fiscal melt 
down, Mario Monti, a technocrat with great experience both of the EU and of 
financial markets, was able to form an unelected government with the only 
ostensible aim of calming down the markets and allowing the fiscal crisis to ease. 
What was the price that the markets asked in exchange for a truce on their 
attacks to the Italian sovereign debt? There is no doubt that much of Monti’s 
success in calming down the markets was due to a decree on market liberalisation. 
The Italian capitalist system has long been known for being extremely closed to 
foreign investment. The system allowed Italian capital to keep control of the Italian 
economy. It revolved around a web of cross-shareholdings that allowed the 
financial and corporate elite to sit on each other’s boards and wield influence over 
several companies often through only a small stake. 
Mario Monti identified the dismantling of this so called Italian ‘Salotto 
Buono’(i.e. the Italian establishment) as the price to pay to financial markets. 
Indeed in Mr Monti’s ‘Save Italy’ liberalisation decreeit was made clear that from 
25thApril, 2012 it would be illegal to hold a board seat in more than one financial 
institution operating in the same market. The aim was clearly that of opening to 
foreign financial capital Italy’s triumvirate of boardroom power, UniCredit, 
Generali and Mediobanca, where no less than six men sit on at least two out of the 
three boards.
iv
 
Moreover, these companies were linked by cross-shareholdings. Mediobanca 
owned 13 per cent of Generali and 7 per cent of UniCredit via a structured finance 
deal. UniCredit owned 9 per cent of Mediobanca. It is worth noticing that through 
this system, Mediobanca, the productive investment powerhouse of Italy, the 
mother of Italian family capitalism, influenced strategic choices at Generali, 
Europe’s third-largest insurer by assets. By eliminating such a link, Italian 
capitalism was out for sale to the same financial markets that attacked its sovereign 
debt.  
Mr Monti’s decision was very controversial in Italy, where discussion opened 
on whether there was a loophole in the decree and if article 36 really meant what it 
appeared to say. As one senior board member of an Italian bank said: ‘If you have 
one or two of those seats, you really don’t want to give them up.’v 
But it seems clear that Monti was determined to put Italian relationship 
capitalism to an end and satisfy foreign investors’ long term desire to get their feet 
in the door by opening up a system that has traditionally been impenetrable to all 
but powerful insiders. 
As Monti said at a press conference: ‘It is natural and dutiful for the 
government to be open to a dialogue with parliament, ’but some changes to the 
liberalisation decree did not ‘cannot and will not be welcomed’.vi 
To be sure, financial markets welcomed a similar approach. Riccardo Barbieri, 
of Mizuho International, praised Mr Monti’s government for its accomplishments 
but said the vote on the liberalisation package and the labour reform negotiations 
were ‘critical’.  
‘Deregulation is necessary and will challenge the government’s ability to win 
concessions even from the strongest lobbies and to change the structure of the 
economy,’ he said.vii 
What prompted the run on the Italian sovereign debt? Was deregulation and 
liberalisation the only way by which the Italian government could address this 
problem? 
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This article will answer these questions by looking at the history of Italian 
commitment of the EMU with the final aim to assess what went wrong. 
 
2. Structural imbalances of the EMU: internal devaluation 
as the only solution 
Much of the blame for the sovereign debt crisis has been put on the dire 
situation of the PIIGS fiscal stance. Although it cannot be denied that the countries 
considered were not enjoying a healthy budgetary situation, it must be noted that 
the policy of fiscal stimulus to combat the crisis came at a high cost for the fiscal 
position of many other countries. For example, the newly elected Obama 
administration introduced a stimulus package of $ 800 billion, bringing the 
budgetary deficit to 10 per cent of GDP in 2009. A similar figure was envisaged for 
the same year in Japan, while in the UK the deficit to GDP figure was almost 13 
per cent. In the eurozone, the deficit to GDP was on average only 6 per cent in 
2010, whereas in the mid1990s it had reached more than 7%
viii
. The situation was 
of course different in the different countries of the eurozone. However, with respect 
to the case of the PIIGS, two points must be stressed. 
First, some of the countries which have since been affected by the most serious 
wave of attacks to their sovereign debt were by no means performing so badly in 
terms of deficit to GDP in the course of the crisis. In 2010, when the attacks 
started, Greece had a deficit to GDP of 10.3%, only 4.3% higher than the eurozone 
average which was 6% at the time. Portugal and Spain with 9.8% and 9.3% 
respectively were just around 3.8% and 3.3% higher than the eurozoneaverage
ix
. 
Italy had actually been doing quite well in the course of the crisis, better than the 
average of the eurozone, with a deficit to GDP of only 4.6% in 2010, which had 
even declined from 5.4% in 2009. Of course, commentators then blame the 
Italiansfor having an outrageous debt to GDP ratio. However, it is worth noting 
that in 1995 this ratio was 121.5% against an average of 72.5% in the rest of the 
future eurozone, whereas by 2010 the difference between the Italian performance 
and the average of the eurozone had actually decreased from 49% in 1995, to 
34%
x
. Moreover, in 2010 Spain had a debt to GDP ratio of 61.2% much below the 
eurozone average of 85.2%, and also Ireland and Portugal were not doing that bad 
with figures of 92.5%and 93.3% respectively
xi
. 
Finally, similar performances of the deficit and debt to GPD ratio must be seen 
in the context of spectacularly declining levels of GDP which by definition, if only 
for mathematical reasons, increase their values. Between 2007 and 2009, Ireland 
lost 12.2% of its real GDP, Greece 6.5%, Spain 7.2%, Italy 6.8% and Portugal 
5.3% (Graph 2) 
 
 
GRAPH 2. Real GDP loss 2007-2010 
Source: EUROSTAT elaboration of the author 
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In an effort to identify the relation between the global financial crisis and the 
crisis of the eurozone, it is important to ask, along with the relevant literature, two 
questions
xii
: 
First, are the larger spreads recorded in the course of the crisis a consequence of 
larger fiscal deficits and debt or do they show a change in the attitude of the 
markets towards the pricing of government credit risk? 
Second, to what extent did the global financial crisis modify the attitude of the 
markets towards credit risk in the direction of more risk aversion? 
The empirical results of a study conducted by the ECB shows that markets 
penalised fiscal imbalances much more strongly after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers in September 2008, to the extent that coefficients for deficit differentials 
were 3-4 times higher and for debt differentials 7-8 times higher during the crisis 
period than earlier (Manganelli et al 2009). So, to answer the first question, the 
markets clearly changed their attitude towards pricing of government credit risk in 
the course of the global financial crisis and in its aftermath. But why did they do 
that? First the study underlines how there was a significant increase in bond 
spreads due to a general increase of risk aversion. This makes a lot of sense if we 
think that over the course of the crisis, the collapse of the stock exchange and of 
the housing market together with a general uncertainty about exposure to very risky 
assets of most of the banking system made it imperative to look for safe havens to 
invest in. We have already underlined how the price of commodities such as gold 
and oil went up as a consequence of the general instability of other forms of 
investment, and how this lead to a commodity price bubble which is considered in 
the literature as the fourth phase in the development of the crisis (Orlowski 2008). 
Also government bonds in the US and, after the start of the crisis, Germany, the 
benchmark in the euro-denominated bond market, assumed a safe-haven 
investment status. Furthermore, not only were investors/markets generally more 
risk averse, but they were also penalizing fiscal imbalances much more strongly 
than before September 2008, as demonstrated by the ECB study. These two factors 
account for much of the spread increase for EU country government bonds relative 
to German or US treasury benchmarks (Manganelli et al 2009).  
It is indeed remarkable that US government bonds, the country where the crisis 
had started and which was experiencing huge fiscal imbalances, instead of 
becoming more risky were unanimously considered by the markets as a safe haven 
in which to invest in a period of instability.  
The case of Germany, however, is less puzzling. In the whole process of 
European monetary integration, from the establishment of the exchange rate 
mechanism of the European Monetary System onwards, Germany had been the ‘1’ 
country of the ‘n-1’ problem, i.e., the country with the strongest currency which 
could, because of the technical characteristics of the fixed exchange rate 
arrangement, define the monetary policy for all the members of the currency 
agreement (De Grauwe 1996:27). More specifically, the ‘n-1’ problem entails that 
in a fixed exchange rate systemthere are only ‘n-1’ independent exchange rates, 
and therefore, while ‘n-1’ countries have to use their monetary policy so as to keep 
their exchange rate fixed, there is always‘1’ country, the one with the strongest 
currency, which is free to set its monetary policy independently of exchange rate 
constraints. Moreover, by definition, the ‘1’ country is the one with the strictest, 
more credible, anti-inflationary monetary policy which allows its currency to be 
stronger than the currencies of the other members of the Union. This, however, has 
evident consequences for the competitiveness of the ‘n-1’ countries, which by 
definition experience higher inflation rates and therefore progressively lose 
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competitiveness up to the point at which their exchange rate becomes unsustainable 
and the markets can successfully speculate against their currencies. 
Although, clearly, in the economic and monetary union there is only one 
monetary policy and no exchange rates, first the global financial crisis and then the 
economic crisis made it clear to what extent the asymmetries and the ‘n-1’ 
problems that had already affected the ERM of the EMS persisted, and were 
actually much more serious, in the EMU. 
Indeed, for the ‘n-1’ countries joining the EMU meant fixing the exchange rate 
at a higher value than it would have otherwise been, and this is particularly true for 
the least competitive countries whose currencies tended to devalue more often 
before the establishment of the EMU, i.e., the PIIGS countries. On the other hand, 
the ‘1’ country, Germany, joined the EMU enjoying a devaluation of its exchange 
rate which, together with the impossibility of any competitive devaluations by the 
other members of the EMU, progressively increased its competitiveness. This trend 
is clearly visible looking at the power purchasing parity real exchange rate (RER)
13
 
of the PIIGS in relation to Germany based on the average consumer price index 
from 2000-2012 (Graph 3).  
 
 
GRAPH 3. PIIGS Real Exchange Rates: 2000-2012 
Source: IMF, WEO-elaboration of the author 
What is important to underline here is that this is a structural characteristic of 
the EMU which was inherited from the previous exchange system but was made 
more serious by the fact that in the EMU there is no possibility to re-gain 
competitiveness through devaluation.  
Thus, from the start of the EMU, Germany enjoyed a structural bonus of 
competitiveness which increased progressively, as, indeed, had been predicted by 
many EPE scholars (Frieden 1991,1994,1998; Eichengreen and Frieden 1994; 
Moravcsick 1998). Of course, exchange rate devaluation is considered in the 
economic literature as a very bad way to regain competitiveness. Much emphasis 
was therefore placed on what is normally referred to as ‘internal devaluation’, or 
‘supply side economics’ which basically means reducing the costs of production by 
increasing productivity and/or reducing labour costs. Indeed, the EU approached 
and still approaches the whole question of growth and employment by relying 
significantly on labour market flexibility, the rationale of which is often neo-
functionally linked to the establishment of EMU. Furthermore, the implementation 
itself of flexible labour market policies was made possible by the strengthening of 
Greece 
Ireland 
Italy 
Portugal 
Spain 
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the bargaining power of employers’ organisations, which was reflected in the 
institutionalisation at the European level of the neo-liberal economic paradigm 
focusing on the implementation of strict monetary and fiscal policies. 
 
3. The neo-functionalist case linking asymmetric shocks to 
labour market flexibility within the EMU 
If we consider the Global financial crisis as an asymmetric shock it is easy to 
identify the neo-functionalist case leading from the EMU crisis to structural reform 
of the labour markets. Asymmetric shocks are defined as economic shocks (both 
demand side and supply side ones) which hit different countries or regions of a 
currency union area in distinct ways. These are likely to happen within the Euro 
area as this does not meet all the requirements of an Optimum Currency Area.
xiii
 By 
definition, autonomous monetary policy and exchange rate policies are not 
available to react to idiosyncratic shocks in a currency union. At the same time, 
common monetary and exchange rate policies should be used with caution since 
they can have mixed results if the other members of the Union are simultaneously 
experiencing a business cycle operating in the opposite direction. Thus, economic 
theory leaves few options: fiscal policy, labour mobility and labour flexibility.  
Indeed, a country could react to an asymmetric shock by using national fiscal 
policy both as a counter-cyclical tool, through the action of automatic stabilisers, 
and in the form of fiscal transfers to solve more long-term economic disparities (as 
in the case of the Italian Mezzogiorno). However, in the special kind of monetary 
union analysed in this chapter, the Maastricht criteria and to an even greater extent 
the requirements of the Stability Pact substantially limit the ability of Member 
States to resort to national fiscal policy in order to tackle asymmetric shocks.  
Alternatively, some authors suggest that the redistributive and stabilising 
functions of fiscal policy be performed at the European level. Proposals on this 
matter range from an increase in the size of the European budget to the pooling of 
national fiscal policies and the establishment of a Common fiscal body, which 
would act as a counterbalance to the ECB (e.g. Obstfeld and Peri 1998). The 
feasibility of similar proposals looks at least dubious in the light of the difficulties 
that the EU Member States encounter in reaching agreement on the much less 
challenging task of tax harmonisation
 
(Overbeek 2000). Moreover, the discussion 
of fiscal policy inevitably raises more general concerns about the loss of national 
sovereignty. Overall, the EU Member States are unable to reach agreement on the 
creation of a common fiscal policy as well as finding some way of increasing the 
size of the EU budget, thus introducing a stabilisation function. 
Given the difficulties in using national fiscal policy to tackle asymmetric 
shocks, and the lack of any substantial fiscal power at the European level, 
economists suggest the option of greater labour mobility. The EU does indeed 
provide an institutional framework within which labour mobility can be enhanced. 
The Treaty’s articles on the free movement of workers, the Single Market 
programme, and recent provisions on migration are all directed toward this 
objective. However, economic analyses show little evidence of mass migration in 
response to asymmetric shocks in the EU (in contrast, in some respects, to the US) 
(Obstfeld and Peri 1998). Indeed, few European policy makers would seriously 
endorse temporary mass migration as a credible way of reacting to national 
economic strains, for obvious political as well as social considerations.  
There thus remains only one policy option for national policy makers who wish 
to tackle the problems arising from asymmetric shocks: increasing the flexibility of 
labour markets so that ‘regions or states affected by adverse shocks can recover by 
cutting wages, reducing relative prices and taking market shares from the others’ 
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(Blanchard 1998: 249). Not only this, but since reform of the labour market is 
clearly a structural intervention, it will also help to eliminate the structural 
component of unemployment, in addition to the cyclical one, if indeed it is still 
possible to distinguish between the two (Artis 1998). 
In fact, as analysed above, the employment rhetoric and strategy officially 
adopted by EU institutions in the last few years clearly shows that the European 
Union has chosen to give priority to labour flexibility as the favoured means to 
tackle the problem of unemployment in Europe.  
However, this is not an automatic necessity stemming from the existence of a 
neo-functional relation between the implementation of the Maastricht path towards 
EMU and labour market flexibility but, as clearly specified above, the consequence 
of the political decisions taken, mostly in an intergovernmental fashion, by the 
Member States within the context of the European Union institutions and 
procedures. These decisions were: first and foremost to establish a currency union 
constrained by the fiscal straightjacket enshrined in the Maastricht criteria and in 
the SGP (especially the first version); and secondly the conclusion that the only 
credible way to react to asymmetric shocks and increase employment was not to 
rely on fiscal stimulation or even fiscal co-ordination, but merely on supply side 
measures like labour market flexibility. In other words, the entirely political 
decision to constrain national fiscal policy within EMU and the even more political 
decision to keep European fiscal policy in a state of infancy, has led to an EES 
which can only rely on the flexibility of labour markets.  
Whether these labour reforms represent the solution to the problem of 
unemployment is indeed a different issue. As Esping-Andersen (1999) reminds us, 
there is a considerable gap between the widely accepted theoretical claims that 
deregulation will create jobs and the evidence that rigidities seem to matter only 
selectively. Moreover, similar labour rigidities must be understood in the context of 
the societal structures where they exist. This is why we now turn our attention to 
the specific case of Italy and the power relation between socio-economic sectors 
with respect to the flexibility of labour markets. 
 
4. Labour market flexibility and socio-economic sectors: 
the case of Italy 
The expression ‘flexibility of labour markets as used by the scholars of 
industrial relations (Rhodes 1997) refers to three forms of flexibility: 
 Internal (or functional) flexibility in the work place; 
 External (or numerical) flexibility vis-à-vis the wider labour market 
 Greater pay flexibility at local levels 
Categorising the level of flexibility/rigidity of European labour markets along 
the dimensions of internal and external flexibility, we can distinguish what in the 
literature is referred to as the ‘southern cluster’ (Rhodes 1997:10-11). This is 
characterised by a remarkable shift from very low levels of both external and 
internal flexibility of the ‘legal’ or ‘licit’ labour markets in the 1970s to a much 
higher level of flexibility in the 1990s. At the same time these economies (first and 
foremost Italy and Spain) saw the growth of ‘illicit’ labour markets and a shift from 
labour exporting to labour importing. 
This process took place amid heated struggles between socio-economic groups 
that inevitably changed the balance of power between them. In this context, the EU 
issues in general and EMU in particular provided the excuse to shift the power 
battle from the national to the European level. This shift was by no means neutral. 
In the move from the national to the international level, some groups acquired more 
strength and cohesion. Others lost a great deal of their bargaining power for 
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reasons ranging from a decreased organisational or representative capacity to a 
structural bias of the EU institutional setting in favour of certain societal interests. 
This game of transnationalisation is indeed played much more easily by the 
employers’ organizations than by the unions, given the many cleavages within the 
European working class reflected in the cumbersome functioning of the European 
Trade Unions Confederation (ETUC) (Talani 2000; Ryner and Schulten 2003). 
Here it is underlined how, by shifting the struggle around labour flexibility in Italy 
and Spain between employers and employees from the national to the European 
level, the relative power positions between the two groups also changed, which 
made it easier to introduce neo-liberal labour market reforms. 
Whether, though, these labour reforms represent the solution to the problem of 
unemployment in Mediterranean countries is indeed a different issue.  
The so-called Mediterranean model is often characterised as a familial one, i.e. 
one based on the assumption that the family male is the only bread winner (Esping-
Andersen 1999). This would explain the exceedingly high levels of female and 
youth unemployment that are not inconsistent with a high level of labour protection 
and a low level of social protection. The family is the locus of social protection, 
and wife and children remain dependent on the income of the father up to a very 
late age. The protection of the job of the latter thus becomes of fundamental 
importance for the entire society. This model differs substantially from the liberal 
model, prevailing in Anglo-Saxon countries, where in the trade off between 
flexibility and exclusion there is a tendency towards the former, along with all that 
this implies in terms of decreasing equality (Esping-Andersen 1999). And indeed in 
Anglo-Saxon countries a high degree of labour market flexibility produces high 
levels of employment at the expense of a growing wage polarisation between 
unskilled and skilled workers (Jessop & Becker 2003).  
It could be claimed that in the era of globalisation the Anglo-Saxon model is the 
only viable one in view of the competitive pressures stemming from lower labour 
costs in less developed countries. Indeed, that is the basic argument used by the 
supporters of flexibility, particularly within employers’ organisations. But apart 
from the fact that the impact of globalisation on employment is far from clear 
(Overbeek 2003), the price in terms of increasing inequality might not be worth 
paying in countries where the societal setting is opposed to the Anglo-Saxon one. 
This, however, is not the place to address the many complex issues influencing the 
future of employment in a globalising world. Therefore we now turn to the analysis 
of the Italian case.  
In Italy, European issues and those related to the process of European monetary 
integration in particular were consistently used by the leading socio-economic 
groups (particularly big industry) to reduce the level of labour protection and 
increase the flexibility of labour markets (Talani 2000).  
To analyse this in more detail the next section will first deal with the decrease in 
labour protection legislation in relation to Italian entry into the exchange rate 
mechanism of the EMS. Subsequently we will address labour market flexibility as 
a consequence of EMU. 
4.1. The EMS and the struggle over the Scala Mobile 
It is generally agreed that the first relaxation in Italian labour protection 
legislation was represented by the abolition of the Italian wage indexation 
mechanism known as the Scala Mobile. This was made possible by commitment to 
the EMS, with all that it implied in terms of strict anti-inflationary policies. The 
abolition of the Scala Mobile was a consequence of the new dominant position of 
Italian capitalist groups and also served to enhance their position. 
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The ‘hot autumn’ of 1969 marked the beginning of the ‘era of union centrality’ 
(Lange et al 1982:97; Giugni 1981:341; Regini 1981). This was an era in which 
Italian economic policy was characterised by prevailing concerns for the 
maintenance of the purchasing power of wages, the institutionalisation of workers’ 
rights and the leading role played by the trade unions and their political 
counterparts in Italian socio-economic policy making. The growing strength of 
trade unions during this period is reflected clearly in the ascending slope of its 
membership parabola, the density rates on which increased constantly from 1969 
onwards before reaching their peak in 1978 with 49% of the total employed 
population, an 18.2% increase with respect to the 1969 figure (see Graph 4). 
 
 
GRAPH 4. Density of union membership in Italy 1969-1985 
Source: Centro Studi Economici Sociali e Sindacali, (CESOS), Le relazioni sindacali in Italia: 
Reports, various issues 
 
The era of union centrality reached its political apex in 1975, with the signing of 
an agreement between the union confederations and Confindustria to upgrade the 
Scala Mobile, a system protecting workers’ wages against inflation. The agreement 
provided for a three month payment of a fixed amount for each unit increase in the 
inflation rate, known as the punto di contingenza.
xiv
 The main features of the 
agreement, which was the product of collective bargaining and not the result of a 
parliamentary process
xv
, were the relatively high and immediate degree of inflation 
protection paying equal amounts to all workers and thus reducing wage 
differentials, and the automatic character of the system. The agreement represented 
a major victory for the union movement. However, the defence of this victory 
proved to be very problematic and, with the beginning of the economic crisis of the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, eventually led to major conflicts not only between the 
unions and their social and political referents, but also within the unions 
themselves. 
In the face of the growing economic problems, particularly unemployment, the 
Italian Union Federation
xvi
 adopted a new strategic orientation in 1978, called the 
EUR strategy. This was based on a trade off between fewer guarantees to the 
workers and more participation in investment decisions, and it was aimed at 
increasing employment through the new instrument of tripartite negotiations with 
the government and employer representatives. Given the increasing involvement of 
the Italian Communist Party in the governmental area, thanks to the pacification 
process between the PCI and the DC (the so-called ‘historic compromise’), this 
‘new course’ of Italian unions appeared to secure their participation in the official 
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sites of decision making on Italian economic policies. On the contrary, in the light 
of the subsequent tragic end to ‘national solidarity’, the EUR strategy marked the 
beginning of a descending parabola of union bargaining power and political 
influence (Accornero 1994). The historic compromise suffered a serious blow with 
the 1978 kidnapping and subsequent murder of DC leader Aldo Moro. 
The dismantling of the Scala Mobile, or at least the substantial reform of its 
mechanisms, together with the reduction of state intervention in the economy, 
constituted the main issues at stake in the domestic debate over the establishment of 
the European Monetary System. Indeed, it was precisely in the course of this debate 
that the differences within the governmental majority and within the union 
federations over the future of the Scala Mobile became unbridgeable. Within the 
union movement itself, the ‘automatic’ increases of the Scala Mobile were 
increasingly attacked. This is true especially for the UIL, which in this period was 
beginning to be controlled by the new Socialist Party (PSI) of Craxi (Merkel 1987), 
and for the CISL, traditionally linked to Catholic interests and to the DC. By 1982, 
for instance, both Pierre Carniti, Secretary General of the CISL and Giorgio 
Benvenuto, Secretary General of UIL, were favourable to a major reform of the 
wage indexation mechanism within the context of tripartite negotiations. On the 
other hand, the Communist component of the CGIL was far less ready than the 
others to modify the system. The inconsistencies in the positions of the different 
unions eventually led to the first major blow to the Scala Mobile represented by the 
accord of 22
nd
 January 1983 (Lange 1986: 30). With this accord, for the first time 
since 1975, the unions accepted the reduction of the automatic inflation-indexed 
payments coupled with an eighteen month freeze of wage bargaining in the private 
corporate sector. This constituted a major defeat, the significance of which should 
not be underestimated, even if the government agreed to protect the real purchasing 
power of workers by cutting taxes, limiting the rise of government controlled prices 
and changing the family allowance system. 
Given the compromise nature of the 1983 accord and the fact that the balance of 
power between unions and employers was still shifting towards the latter, in late 
1983 the unions agreed to pursue a possible revision of the 1983 accord. The issues 
at stake were still wages and job flexibility and, above all the Scala Mobile, but this 
time Confindustria was taking a much tougher position and the unions reached the 
negotiating table without having achieved a joint position. The CISL and the UIL 
were favourable to further reductions in the Scala Mobile, while the CGIL made the 
reform of the system conditional on the government's commitment not to distribute 
the costs of further economic growth and employment exclusively among the 
working class. The situation was further complicated by the governmental 
leadership of Bettino Craxi, who sought to enhance the power of the executive in 
taking hard economic policy decisions (decisionismo) and by an even stronger 
opposition to the Communist Party. The atmosphere was so heated that in early 
February 1984, the communist and the socialist factions of the CGIL split, 
assuming different positions on the Scala Mobile and on the need to consult the 
workers before signing any agreement. This step slowed, if not prevented, CGIL 
participation in any compromise. On the 12
th
 of February the Minister of Labour 
Gianni De Michelis presented a draft accord that maintained the trade off nature of 
the 1983 accord. It proposed a limitation of the number of units to be paid every 
three months during 1984, but it also promised that the following year fiscal 
interventions would compensate any unforeseen losses in case there came higher 
inflation rates. The CISL and the UIL promptly declared their willingness to 
conclude negotiations, while the CGIL, after a moment of hesitation, declared its 
unwillingness to accept it, thus joining the PCI in its negative assessment of the 
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manoeuvre. Open conflict broke out between the government on one side, and the 
PCI and the communist component of the CGIL on the other side, when Craxi 
translated the basic terms of the 14
th
 February protocol into a decree to be converted 
into law. Despite the campaign of the communists and their parliamentary allies, 
especially the deputies of the Democrazia Proletaria, and despite the massive 
popular demonstrations throughout Italy, this eventually happened on 12
th
 June 
1984. In June the PCI decided to pursue a referendum on article 3 of the decree, 
which was the one that concerned the cuts to the Scala Mobile. By late September 
more than the required number of signatures had been submitted. On the 7
th
 of 
December 1984 the Central Office of the Corte di Cassazione declared the 
referendum constitutional. On the 9
th
 and 10
th
 of June 1985, after a long and bitter 
referendum campaign had further complicated by the administrative elections of 
12
th
 May 1985, Italian voters finally defeated the PCI’s efforts to overturn article 3 
when 54.3% voted ‘no’ and only 46.7% voted ‘yes’.  
The long battle over the Scala Mobile made it manifestly clear that the era of 
Italian political economy characterised by the market and political power of the 
union movement and by the PCI’s ability to act as a political ‘guarantor’ of union 
cooperation with government policy had come to an end. The battle over the Scala 
Mobile, transcending its economic meaning, became a struggle over the balance of 
power within the different Italian socio-political and economic actors. The issue at 
stake was the control over the pattern of growth and distribution in the Italian 
political economy. With its conclusion, the basic contours of the political economy 
had fundamentally changed and the era of union centrality had ended with the 
labour movement and the PCI as net losers.  
4.2.  Italy, EMU and labour market flexibility 
The tendency of the Confindustria to approach the problems of labour costs 
through the mechanisms by which they are determined, starting from indexation, 
was confirmed by the following round of the battle over the Scala Mobile which 
led to its definitive abolishment with the 1993 agreement.  
After a long controversy between the CGIL, CISL, UIL, Confindustria and the 
government, the latter had, with the law No. 191 (13
th
 July 1990) extended the 
Scala Mobile for the whole year 1991. However, from January 1992 the 
mechanism was again under the bargaining autonomy of the social partners. At the 
expiration of the deadline, the government confirmed, with the Protocol of 
December 1991, its firm decision not to allow any other extension by law of the 
Scala Mobile (Talani 2000). It indeed stated that all the problems relating to a new 
general system of bargaining and to the structure of retribution should be tackled 
by the 1st of June 1992. The battle was likely to be extremely tough unless some 
external factor arose pressing the trade unions, or better the CGIL, to accept the 
agreement on wage policy as the only possible alternative to the abyss. This 
external factor was represented by the speculative attacks on the lira within the 
Exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System.  
This does not necessarily mean that the Italian economic elite provoked the 
speculative attacks, but the Italian employers’ class certainly acted within the limits 
of the possible. Indeed, the Protocol eventually signed on 31
st
 July 1992 
represented a major victory for the employers. The trade unions had agreed to the 
almost complete elimination of the Scala Mobile and had accepted that wage 
bargaining at plant level for the whole 1993 would be blocked in exchange of a 
forfeit sum of Lit. 20.000 (+ $8) a month for all workers (Talani 2000).  
The question of the structure of wage bargaining, not tackled in the Protocol, 
was left to further negotiations, leading to the agreement of 1993. The latter 
institutionalised the new balance of power between Italian social partners by 
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introducing two levels of collective bargaining: the national and the plant levels. 
Moreover, it provided the launch pad for future changes of social protection 
legislation, particularly reform of the pension system (Regini et al 1997). Finally it 
increased the level of flexibility of the Italian labour markets by improving the 
Italian training system (boosting internal flexibility) and legalising temporary work 
agencies (improving external flexibility) (Rhodes 1997: 14).  
In the context of the decreasing bargaining power of the trade unions, some 
steps towards the deregulation of employment conditions had already been taken 
with the Law 223/91which modified the procedures of placement by introducing 
the so-called ‘nominative call’ in place of the ‘compulsory call’. It also recognised 
collective dismissals as a possible solution for firms’ crises, a measure which, 
together with the introduction of a new instrument of mobility insurance (a longer 
form of early retirement), was supposed to guarantee Italian companies the 
freedom to fire staff in case of necessity (Gualmini 1998). Coming to the hire side 
of liberalising policies, Law 223 abolished the obligation for firms to choose 
workers from the compulsory hiring lists (liste di disoccupazione) and introduced 
the principle of free choice.  
In terms of job creation and labour market flexibility, a number of further 
initiatives were taken later on, particularly by the Berlusconi governments, on the 
effectiveness of which, however, some doubts have been cast. Law 451/94 
introduced the so-called ‘public utility works’xvii which seemed to many yet another 
form of badly concealed assistenzialismo whose only outcome was to postpone the 
problem of unemployment for a very limited number of people. Moreover some 
fiscal incentives for young employers starting new enterprises were introduced by 
the first Berlusconi government, as was a law on ad-interim jobs. 
However, it was the second Berlusconi government, elected in May 2001, that 
would be the most active on the side of labour market flexibility. 
On the 3rd of October 2001, the then-minister of Labour, Roberto Maroni, 
presented a white book on the labour market (Libro Bianco sul mercato del lavoro) 
containing a number of measures to render the Italian labour market more 
flexible.
xviii
 On the 15th of November 2001, the government proposed a draft law 
(the Disegno di legge delega Ddl 848) to delegate to the government the power to 
legislate on all issues relating to employment and labour market.  
After a long period of social struggle amongst the Italian socio-economic 
groups, and after the murder of the father of the labour market reform, Professor 
Marco Biagi, the government and 39 employers’ and employees’ associations 
signed, on the 5
th
 of July 2002, the so-called Pact for Italy (Patto per l’Italia), 
declaring the necessity to adopt the law as soon as possible
xix
. On the 5
th
 of 
February 2003 the Italian Parliament finally approved the Ddl 848 which became 
the Law n.30 of the 14th of February 2003, also known as the Biagi law. The latter 
entered into force on the 13
th
 of March 2003. From that day onwards, the 
government has had the power to pass any laws regarding the reform of the labour 
market without having to go through the parliamentary procedure.  
The content of this reform is clearly oriented towards a marked increase of the 
degree of liberalisation and flexibility of the labour market. It is however important 
to note that the overall rate of unemployment is not the only problem to be faced by 
Italian labour. More serious challenges arise from the pervasiveness of the black 
market and the great differences in terms of region, age and gender.
xx
 
 
5. Conclusions 
In conclusion, the neo-functionalist case automatically linking the establishment 
of EMU to the flexibility of labour markets seems to conceal a number of power 
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struggles amongst the different socio-economic groups at both the national and the 
transnational levels. 
Indeed, the implementation of an EU employment strategy relying significantly 
on labour market flexibility, the rationale of which is often neo-functionally linked 
to the establishment of EMU, is certainly not the only possible approach to 
European unemployment and is the outcome of a series of political decisions taken 
by the Member States within the context of the EU institutions and procedures. 
Furthermore, the implementation of flexible labour market policies was itself made 
possible by the strengthening of the bargaining power of employers’ organisations 
which was reflected in the institutionalisation at the European level of the neo-
liberal economic paradigm focusing on the implementation of strict monetary and 
fiscal policies.  
If it is true that the process of globalisation has modified the role of the nation 
state from the welfare model to the Anglo-Saxon model or ‘competition state’ 
(Cerny 1999), it might be argued that the process of regionalisation allows for a 
simplification of this process by strengthening the institutional power of 
transnational capitalist elites vis-à-vis organised labour in the shift from the 
national to the European level of governance. This game of transnationalisation is 
indeed much more easily played by employers’ organisations than by the unions, 
given the many divides within the labour interest representation groups and the 
disaggregating tendencies embedded in the present globalised capitalist structure.  
Whether, then, this process of transnationalisation is the outcome of the pro-
active role of organised transnational actors or is the inevitable result of the 
restructuring of the world economy in the context of globalisation, is a subject for 
further analysis.  
As far as this article is concerned, it seems clear that this redefinition of the 
power relations amongst socio-economic groups is well advanced and was clearly 
favoured by the role played by the process of European monetary integration. 
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